Since its inception in 1952, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) has been the main source of capital for long term investments in the Brazilian corporate environment 1 Such gigantism raises two main questionings: the economic fairness of the money spent, and the BNDES's impact on the governance quality of its invested companies.
Regarding the first issue, the BNDES lends resources at a cost that is mainly subsidized by taxpayers (using funds from the National Treasury) and through workers (using the Workers' Support Fund, a compulsory contribution paid by all registered workers -FAT).
In 2009, for example, the government lent R$ 100 billion to the bank to be repaid by applying the so-called "Long-Term Interest Rate" (TJLP), an interest rate lower than Selic (the official rate set by the Central Bank which is paid by the government to finance its public debt). On the other hand, large companies -usually the ones with better credit risk and higher 4 probability of raising funds through the market -are the main beneficiaries of these funds.
According to BNDES, 83% of its outlays in 2009 were directed to large companies. The fact that these companies´ financing was subsidized mostly by low-income workers even drew the attention of the magazine The Economist's in its report on Brazil in late 2009. At that time, the publication criticized the initiative, calling it "a bizarre appropriation of public resources that would cause an outcry in other countries" 2 .
The second issue deals with the potential impact of BNDES on the corporate governance practices of the large companies it invests in. This is the focus of this essay.
Conceptually, the bank may act as "doubled-edged sword" regarding this issue. On the one hand, its power and influence could induce companies to adopt the highest corporate governance standards, with positive impacts for other investors and for the market in general.
On the other hand, the abundant supply of financial resources at low cost without any governance requirements or explicit consideration of this issue could discourage companies from improving their practices as a way of competing for resources. 
Sources: BNDES managerial reports and CVM reports (Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission).
So far, there are no academic studies clearly indicating any positive impacts of the BNDES on corporate governance practices in Brazil. However, an analysis of its public information regarding its recent credit and stockholding operations does not suggest that the bank has been an effective inducer of higher corporate governance standards.
Regarding its credit operations, there is no mention in the institution's reports about the weight, if any, given to corporate governance aspects in its decisions to approve loans to large companies. Therefore, the bank does not clearly say how important the adoption of best corporate governance practices are for the approval of its credit operations, nor states which governance practices are taken into account when it analyzes its loan requests. From the companies' point of view, it's not clear how much is worth to be invested in better governance practices, nor which practices could increase the probability of being well evaluated and having its loan requests approved. Regarding its role as a shareholder, 74% of BNDESPAR's investments in stocks (estimated in about R$ 93 billion in market value at the end of 2009) were concentrated in 11 companies 4 , and the bank also held a significant amount of shares in 24 other companies 5 .
An investigation of the governance standards of these 35 companies where BNDESPar holds a significant shareholding stake reinforces the idea that the bank does not pay enough attention to this issue. Only nine of these companies are listed on the Novo Mercado. In addition, we have applied a governance score analysis based on the governance scoring method developed for the annual award "The Best Brazilian Companies for Shareholders", prepared by Capital Aberto Magazine. The analysis revealed that the companies in which BNDESPAR invests have a governance score similar to the other listed companies analyzed.
Once again, this indicated that the bank does not promote higher governance standards.
The group of companies where BNDESPAR is a relevant shareholder also includes some companies that were recently in trouble for bad governance practices, such as Fibria (a pulp and paper company that incurred in huge losses due to speculation with derivatives In 2008) and Copel (a state-owned energy utility that generated several complains from minority shareholders after decisions from its controlling shareholder that were harmful to the company's profitability Given that corporate governance practices don't seem to be a key factor for investments by BNDES and its private equity arm BNDEPS, what could be done to improve this situation? Regarding loan operations, a simple yet effective manner of minimizing these issues would be to create specific criteria that would reward companies with higher governance standards. Some years ago, the bank itself went down this path by creating an incentive mechanism entitled "BNDES Program for the Adoption of Corporate Governance Practices". Through this program, companies that adopted certain predefined practices would be awarded with a bonus (reductions in the interest rates of its loans, an increase in the ratio of the bank's capital invested in the projects, or extended loan maturities). However, the program inexplicably was shelved before it was even launched. Another possibility would be to demand that companies undertaking operations worth more than a certain amount to go public, as a means of increasing their accountability and their monitoring by the market.
Regarding the bank's activities as a shareholder, it could follow the example of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which ties its capital allocation in a large project to an objective commitment by the investee company to improve its governance practices. In the case of the IFC, a branch of the World Bank, companies are subjected to a corporate governance evaluation. Based on that, a "corporate governance progression matrix" is applied, consisting of five governance dimensions divided into four levels of evolution. At the end of the process, approval for the operation is partially based on the commitment of the company to progress in each one of the governance dimensions under consideration. A similar tool could be developed by the BNDES.
These are simple measures that could clearly signal the bank's concern with the best governance standards, thus reducing the possibility of questioning about the criteria it used for its disbursements. In fact, the BNDES should look for the higher standards not only in a pursuit of alignment with the "best recommended practices", but to defend its own financial interests. After all, good governance tends to reduce investment risk (including reputational ones), as well as increase the probability of greater returns through better top managerial decisions.
This would be another of the various contributions of the bank to the development of the country, since environments with well governed firms tend to be more trustable to local and international investors, generating greater capital supply. "To spread the concept and incentive corporate governance" is already one of the formal goals of BNDES on its publicly documents 8 . The bank should now convince the market the he put this in practice.
